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Regional Taxation in State Tax Reform 
Kirk J. Stark* 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article describes and evaluates a specific subset of state tax 
reforms—i.e., those involving regional approaches to funding subnational 
public goods. Reforms examined include those where policymakers devise 
new multijurisdictional fiscal arrangements to address regional objectives 
that conventional local governments, by virtue of their more limited 
geographic scope, are unlikely to tackle. As used in this article, the term 
“region” refers to a geographic area (1) constituting less than the entire 
jurisdiction of a state, and (2) encompassing more than one local 
government jurisdiction. A “regional tax” is therefore any tax (fee, 
assessment, etc.…) limited in its application to a geographic area so 
defined. A closely related policy is “regional tax base sharing”—i.e., the 
imposition of a uniform region-wide tax on a base that is shared among 
several local jurisdictions, with the proceeds distributed among those 
localities. There are numerous instances of regional taxation and regional 
tax base sharing across the U.S. subnational public finance landscape. 
Some of these examples are familiar to a tax policy audience (such as the 
Minneapolis-St. Paul tax base sharing system), while others are less well 
known (such as the Denver Scientific and Cultural Facilities District). In 
most cases, the fiscal arrangement examined governs multiple counties 
spanning an entire metropolitan region. Following an evaluation of both 
successful and failed efforts at regional tax arrangements, the article 
considers possible extensions of these policies, discussing how regional 
taxes might be employed in contexts beyond the relatively narrow areas in 
which they currently apply. 
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Steve Sheffrin, Fred Silva, Sloan Speck, Eric Zolt, and participants in workshops at Tulane University, 
University of Colorado, UCLA, and Washington University in St. Louis. 
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The focus of most state and local tax reform efforts is, understandably, 
the tax policy of existing state and local governments. That is to say, most 
tax reform proposals accept as fixed the current legal and institutional 
architecture of state and local governments and then ask how best to fund 
the expenditures of those governments. The jurisdictional scope of fiscal 
responsibilities is not the object of reform. Rather, existing boundaries are 
accepted as given, leaving the tax policy analyst with seemingly ancillary 
questions of funding. Which taxes are most suitable for cities, counties or 
school districts and which are best left to the states? What is the optimal 
mix of tax instruments for each level of government? How might these 
governments reform their tax structures to make them simpler, more 
equitable, or more efficient? 
Academic research on these questions has generated numerous insights, 
providing a blueprint for possible improvements in state and local tax 
policy.1 Yet the prevailing assumption of fixed boundaries has 
unnecessarily limited the scope of possible reforms.2 Once we dispense 
with that assumption, and extend tax policy analysis to include a 
reconsideration of jurisdictional boundaries along with tax design, a 
broader range of reform options comes into focus. 
This article considers one class of reforms situated at the underexplored 
intersection of tax policy and governance structure—i.e., those involving 
regional approaches to funding subnational public goods. More precisely, 
the situations I wish to examine are those where policymakers turn to new 
multijurisdictional fiscal arrangements to address regional objectives that 
conventional local governments, by virtue of their more limited 
geographic scope, are unlikely to tackle. As used in this article, the term 
“region” refers to a geographic area (1) constituting less than the entire 
jurisdiction of a state, and (2) encompassing more than one local 
 
1. See, e.g., STATE AND LOCAL FISCAL POLICY: THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX? STUDIES IN FISCAL 
FEDERALISM AND STATE-LOCAL FINANCE (ed. Sally Wallace 2010). 
2. This is not to suggest, of course, that there is a shortage of commentary on useful reforms, but 
rather that the reforms considered typically involve modifying policies of existing jurisdictional units. 
Consider, for example, the writings of David Brunori, a leading commentator on U.S. state and local 
tax policy. See David Brunori, LOCAL TAX POLICY, A FEDERALIST PERSPECTIVE (Urban Institute 
Press 2003); David Brunori, STATE TAX POLICY: A PRIMER (Urban Institute Press 2016). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/10
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government jurisdiction or portions of multiple jurisdictions. A “regional 
tax” is therefore any tax (fee, assessment, etc.…) limited in its application 
to a geographic area so defined. As discussed further below, a closely 
related policy is “regional tax base sharing”—i.e., the imposition of a tax 
on a base that is shared among several local jurisdictions, with the 
proceeds distributed among those localities.3  
One distinction between these two approaches lies in the nature of the 
expenditures financed. Regional taxes are typically imposed for the 
purpose of funding a specific regional public good. In the contemporary 
U.S. setting, the most common regional tax is the multicounty sales tax 
imposed to fund metropolitan mass transit systems.4 By contrast, regional 
tax base sharing entails no particular regional expenditure but rather a 
distribution of regional tax revenues to local governments within the 
region. Both approaches can be understood as governance reforms that 
reconfigure the vertical division of fiscal responsibilities, a longstanding 
preoccupation in the branch of fiscal federalism research concerning tax 
and expenditure assignment. Here, however, rather than assigning fiscal 
responsibilities to pre-specified units of government, we are adjusting 
boundaries to alter the geographic scope of fiscal responsibilities. 
There are numerous instances of regional taxation and regional tax base 
sharing across the U.S. subnational public finance landscape. In the 
sections that follow, I examine several examples of these two forms of 
regional fiscal innovation, illustrating how each advances or departs from 
normative principles developed in the literature on fiscal federalism. Some 
of these examples are familiar to a tax policy audience (such as the 
Minneapolis-St. Paul tax base sharing system), while others are less well 
known (such as the Denver Scientific and Cultural Facilities District). In 
most cases, the fiscal arrangement examined governs multiple counties 
spanning an entire metropolitan region. For this reason, many of these 
regional tax structures have garnered the attention of scholars interested in 
developing alternative institutions of regional governance for metropolitan 
 
3. To be sure, alternative definitions are certainly possible. For example, one particularly 
intriguing possibility would be to consider how we might encourage new “regional” tax policies 
involving two or more states, such as a carbon tax adopted by multiple states and implemented via 
interstate compact. While intriguing and worthy of additional study, such institutional arrangements 
are beyond the scope of this article. 
4. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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areas.5 If these ambitious plans for more robust institutions of metropolitan 
governance are ever to come to fruition, regional tax policies will likely be 
necessary to ensure their viability. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Part II provides a 
conceptual framework, situating regional tax arrangements within the 
theoretical literature on fiscal federalism relating to optimal jurisdiction 
size and tax/expenditure assignment. In order to give some sense of the 
types of arrangements already in place, Part III describes a handful of key 
examples of regional taxation and regional tax base sharing in operation 
throughout the United States. As we will see, regional taxes have emerged 
in several metropolitan areas, typically in connection with metropolitan 
transit funding and, more recently, regional cultural asset districts. The 
policy of regional tax base sharing is much less common, but the 
Minneapolis-St. Paul fiscal disparities program has been extensively 
studied, if not widely replicated. As a result, we have the benefit of a good 
deal of academic wisdom on this policy, which will be briefly 
summarized. Finally, Part IV considers possible extensions of these 
policies, discussing how regional taxes or regional tax base sharing might 
figure in state tax reform efforts in the future, with a particular focus on 
recent developments and reform options in California. 
 
I. FISCAL FEDERALISM AND THE BOUNDARY PROBLEM 
 
Much of the theoretical work in fiscal federalism and multilevel public 
finance concerns the division of fiscal responsibilities among different 
levels of government. An important subset of this literature examines 
questions of expenditure assignment and tax assignment—that is, which 
spending obligations and which funding instrument should be assigned to 
which levels of government.6 There is a logical tendency in this literature 
to trifurcate the division of fiscal responsibilities among central, 
 
5. DAVID Y. MILLER & RAYMOND W. COX III, GOVERNING THE METROPOLITAN REGION: 
AMERICA’S NEW FRONTIER (2014).  
6. Richard M. Bird, Rethinking Subnational Taxes: A New Look at Tax Assignment, 20 TAX 
NOTES INT’L, 2069-96 (2000); Richard A. Musgrave, Who Should Tax, Where, and What?, in TAX 
ASSIGNMENT IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES (Charles E. McLure, Jr. ed., 1983); ROBIN BROADWAY & 
ANWAR SHAH, FISCAL FEDERALISM: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF MULTIORDER GOVERNANCE 133 
(2009). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/10
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intermediate, and local jurisdictions, an organizing scheme that fits 
standard practice in most of the world’s federations, including the United 
States.7 Indeed, the word “assignment” itself implies a preexisting set of 
potential assignees among which those responsibilities are to be divided.  
At a higher level of abstraction, however, the assignment question can 
be recast as how best to configure fiscal responsibilities across geographic 
space, with an infinite number of choices lying along a continuum rather 
than simply three levels of government. This is admittedly something of 
an artificial, semantic distinction, but framing the question this way helps 
to remind us of the foundational nature of the exercise.  Boundaries are of 
course human constructs and subject to revision. Jurisdictions can be 
merged, annexed, dissolved, newly created, etc., and these boundary 
adjustment devices are therefore available for use as part of the fiscal 
policy toolkit.8 Thus, the question is not just one of assignment but also, 
potentially, one of specifying new or different boundaries. That is, for any 
given set of public goods and tax instruments, what is the most appropriate 
specification of boundaries? And what principles should guide us in 
answering that question? 
The theoretical literature on fiscal federalism provides a framework for 
addressing these questions. In his classic treatise on fiscal federalism, 
Wallace Oates captures the essence of the boundary problem through the 
development of his “correspondence principle.”9 In the simplest case, the 
Oates analysis suggests that the optimal structure of federalism is that “in 
which the jurisdiction that determines the level of provision of each public 
good includes precisely the set of individuals who consume the good”—
i.e., “a case of perfect correspondence in the provision of public goods.”10  
But the simplest case is quickly complicated by factors such as 
preference heterogeneity, interjurisdictional spillovers, and cost 
differences associated with public goods provision at different levels of 
aggregation. As Oates explains, where there is local variation in 
 
7. See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Tax Assignment Problem: Ruminations on How Theory 
and Practice Depend on History, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 339, 340 (2001). 
8. See, e.g., David Rusk, Annexation and the Fiscal Fate of Cities, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, 
METROPOLITAN POLICY PROGRAM (Aug. 2006), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/ 
06/20060810_fateofcities.pdf (discussing the fiscal effects of boundary modification via annexation). 
9. WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 31-53 (1972). 
10. Id. at 34. (emphasis added). 
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preferences regarding the level of public goods, and no difference in cost 
between central and local provision, centralized provision is likely to be 
suboptimal. This “decentralization theorem” provides a theoretical basis 
for local provision of public goods without regard to the effect of taxpayer 
mobility considered in the Tiebout model. At the same time, however, 
Oates emphasizes that there are likely benefits associated with the 
provision of public goods at a higher level of government, either from 
economies of scale or in limiting the interjurisdictional spillovers 
associated with decentralized provision.11 In combination, these factors 
suggest a tradeoff between, as Fisher puts it, “having governments big 
enough to avoid cost or benefit spillovers but small enough to allow 
uniform desired amounts of public service.”12   
It is apparent from this formulation of Oates’ principle that the existence 
or degree of correspondence between boundaries and benefits is heavily 
dependent on the spatial characteristics of the particular public good in 
question.13 Each public good likely has its own spatial characteristics, 
ranging from purely local to purely global.14 In theory, there is an optimal 
fiscal arrangement that is unique to each public good. As Mancur Olson 
notes in his discussion of “fiscal equivalence”—a concept with close 
parallels to Oates’s correspondence principle—“there is a need for a 
separate governmental institution for every collective good with a unique 
boundary, so that there can be a match between those who receive the 
benefits of a collective good and those who pay for it.”15  
Taken to its logical extreme, one could imagine separate governments 
for each and every local public good, all of them with their own unique 
boundaries set to match the population of beneficiaries as closely as 
 
11. Id. 
12. RONALD C. FISHER, STATE & LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE 125 (4th ed. 2015).  
13. Vito Tanzi emphasizes this point in an insightful 1996 essay on the subject.  See Vito Tanzi, 
Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization: A Review of Some Efficiency and Macroeconomic Aspects, in 
1995 ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 295, 298-299 (1996).  
14. In practice, public goods rarely fit neatly into the categories of “purely local” or “purely 
global.” Nevertheless, some public goods are more local in nature while others have a global 
dimension. In the former category we might include an access road that enables residents of a 
particular locality to reach a particular area, while an example of the latter would be projects designed 
to mitigate the effects of climate change. 
15. Mancur Olson, Jr., The Principle of “Fiscal Equivalence”: The Division of Responsibilities 
Among Different Levels of Government, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 479, 483 (1969).    
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/10
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possible. This multiplicity of function-specific local governments, or 
something approximating it, seems to be at the heart of a concept 
developed by Swiss economists Reiner Eichenberger and Bruno Frey, who 
envision a system of  “Functional, Overlapping and Competing 
Jurisdictions” (FOCJ) for local public goods.16  As Eichenberger and Frey 
explain, jurisdictional boundaries must be sufficiently flexible to adapt to 
the “geography of problems.”17  In the U.S. setting, the current mix of 
general purpose cities and counties, along with numerous function-specific 
special districts (ranging from school districts to goose pond maintenance) 
seems to capture something of a middle ground. 
For purposes of the present analysis, the key theoretical insight from 
both Oates and Olson is that public goods should be provided by a 
government whose jurisdictional boundaries correspond, to the maximum 
degree practicable, with the population of individuals likely to benefit 
from their provision (subject to the countervailing considerations 
regarding interjurisdictional spillovers and economies of scale). In 
addition, these same groupings should, in theory, generally be responsible 
for financing the public goods they receive, so as to ensure as tight a 
linkage as possible between burden and benefit. All of these theoretical 
insights are subject to the caveat that history, politics, and administrative 
practicalities are likely to exert a strong influence on real-world 
arrangements. Nevertheless, attention to these principles in crafting fiscal 
policy should exert some general pressure in the direction of an optimal 
level of public goods, as well as a minimization of jurisdictional 
spillovers. 
Once a determination is made regarding the proper geographic scope of 
public goods provision, we are still left with the question of how best to 
finance those goods. This is the question of tax assignment or, as 
Musgrave put it, “Who should tax, where, and what?”18  A vast literature 
 
16. Bruno Frey, Functional Overlapping, Competing Jurisdictions: Redrawing the Geographic 
Borders of Administration, 5 EUR. J.L. REFORM 543, 546 (2003); Reiner Eichenberger & Bruno S. 
Frey, Functional, Overlapping, and Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJ): A Complement and Alternative 
to Today’s Federalism, in HANDBOOK OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 154–81 (Ehtisham Ahmad & Giorgio 
Brosio eds. 2006).  
17. Reiner Eichenberger and Bruno S. Frey, Democratic Governance for a Globalized World, 55 
KYKLOS 265, 267 (2002). 
18. Musgrave, supra note 6. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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spanning several decades has examined these questions, but the insights of 
that work is perhaps best summarized by the following three principles 
offered by Oates:  
(1)  Lower levels of government... should, as much as possible, rely 
on benefit taxation of mobile economic units, including households 
and mobile factors of production.  
(2) To the extent that non-benefit taxes need to be employed on 
mobile economic units, perhaps for redistributive purposes, this 
should be done at higher levels of...government; and 
 (3) To the extent that local governments make use of non-benefit 
taxes, they should employ them on tax bases that are relatively 
immobile across local jurisdictions.19   
One distressing implication of these principles is that the choice of tax 
instruments for local governments is extremely circumscribed. The only 
tax instruments regarded as suitable for local utilization are property taxes 
and user fees20 In practice, of course, local governments rely on a much 
broader array of taxes, including income and sales taxes, as well as other 
miscellaneous taxes.21 The fact that we observe local taxes other than user 
fees and property taxes is not necessarily inconsistent with standard 
principles of tax assignment. For example, reliance on local income taxes 
may reflect a local preference for some measure of redistribution.22  Over 
the long term, however, systematic deviation from these principles is 
likely to result in various costs such as an erosion of the tax base through 
interjurisdictional competition and corresponding distortions in firms’ 
 
19. Wallace E. Oates, Taxation in a Federal System: The Tax-assignment Problem, 1 PUB. ECON. 
REV. 35 (1996), quoted in Richard M. Bird, Rethinking Subnational Taxes: A New Look At Tax 
Assignment, 20 TAX NOTES INT’L 2069, 2070 (2000). 
20. Bev Dahlby, Taxing Choices: Issues in the Assignment of Taxes in Federations, 167 INT’L SOC. 
SCI. J. 93 (2001).   
21. For a sense of the variety of taxes relied upon by local governments, see Christine R. Martell & 
Adam Greenwade, Profiles of Local Government Finance, available in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 184 (eds. Robert D. Ebel & John E. Petersen 2012). 
22. Mark V. Pauly, Income Redistribution as a Local Public Good, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 35 (1973); 
Michael Craw, Deciding to Provide: Local Decisions on Providing Social Welfare, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
906 (2010); Michael Craw, Caught at the Bottom? Redistribution and Local Government in an Era of 
Devolution, 47 STATE & LOCAL GOV’T REV. 68 (2015); CLAYTON GILLETTE, LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION 
AND LOCAL DEMOCRACY (Yale Univ. Press 2011) 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/10














In keeping with the perspective noted earlier—i.e., that boundary 
adjustments can be utilized as an alternative to “assigning” fiscal 
responsibilities to pre-specified units of government—we can augment 
Oates’s three principles of tax assignment to include boundary adjustment 
as a method by which to manipulate the “local-ness” of any given tax. In 
Oates’ language, there are “lower levels of government” and “higher 
levels of government” and the decision-making axis concerns the question 
of which taxes should be assigned to which level.24 An alternative 
approach, however, is to specify some revenue instrument and then to craft 
geographic boundaries that provide the best “fit” for that revenue source.  
One can almost imagine setting fiscal boundaries via a computerized 
zoom function, zooming in or out over a given metropolitan region to 
capture the appropriate geographic scope of different tax instruments. 
Enlarging the geographic scope of the jurisdiction, from local to regional, 
alters certain factors that would ordinarily be considered in making tax 
assignment judgments. In a regional setting, taxpayers will have fewer exit 
options as compared to a local setting, and interjurisdictional competition 
is correspondingly diminished. These are not necessarily positive 
attributes of regional taxation in every case; the pros and cons of 
regionalization are likely to vary by the specific tax under consideration. 
The important point here is that there is value in configuring the 
geographic scope of a particular tax that is wholly independent of the 
geographic characteristics of the public goods or services being financed.  
Regardless of what is being funded, some taxes are better suited for use 
within more confined geographic areas (e.g., property taxes) while other 
taxes are better suited for use across larger areas (e.g., corporate income 
taxes). 
A similar point is developed, albeit without specific reference to 
regional taxes, in Oates’s discussion of the value of tax harmonization 
among decentralized units of government. Tax harmonization is the 
conceptual equivalent of a boundary modification that encompasses all the 
 
23. See, e.g., Andrew Haughwout et al., Local Revenue Hills: Evidence from Four U.S. Cities, 86 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 570 (2004). 
24. See Oates, supra note 19; see also Wallace Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 1120, 1121, 1126 (1999). 
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jurisdictions whose taxes are harmonized. For example, consider a region 
that consists of four jurisdictions that each impose a wage tax but with 
different rates and different base definitions. In such a context, it would be 
reasonable to expect taxpayers to make decisions regarding which 
jurisdiction to live or work in based on these differences in tax rates and 
tax base. However, if a rule is adopted requiring harmonization of tax rates 
and bases among these jurisdictions, taxpayers will no longer have the 
ability to change the tax rate or base rule to which they are subject by 
opting for a particular jurisdiction (since all tax rates and bases are now, 
by assumption, identical). Of course, this would also be true if the region 
as a whole simply adopted a single, uniform income tax and distributed the 
revenues among the four jurisdictions. 
As this example illustrates, a fully harmonized tax system, with no 
interjurisdictional variation in the rate or base, is the functional equivalent 
of a centralized tax coupled with a system of intergovernmental grants 
where the grants are distributed among the subunits based on a source 
principle. The act of legal harmonization involves subsuming the 
sovereign prerogatives of those jurisdictions whose taxes are harmonized, 
with the taxpayer left facing a legal regime indistinguishable from a single 
centralized tax. There are many benefits to such harmonization, especially 
in the case of taxes on mobile economic actors. Most significantly, under a 
fully harmonized tax system, individuals and firms would no longer have 
an incentive to migrate on account of interjurisdictional tax differences. In 
addition, because taxpayers face only one set of rules, harmonizing taxes 
across jurisdictions promotes administrative simplicity, easing compliance 
burdens. On the other hand, in a regime of tight harmonization the 
potential efficiency benefits derived from respecting preference 
heterogeneity as to local tax burdens is lost. This is an inescapable 
downside of requiring tax harmony across jurisdictions as taxpayers can 
no longer choose from a variety of local tax regimes.  The challenge of 
fiscal policy in a multijurisdictional setting is finding the optimal balance 
between local fiscal autonomy (promoting variety and choice) and 
centralized coordination (minimizing the costs associated with variety and 
choice). Fiscal arrangements involving regions—again, defined here as a 
jurisdiction encompassing less than an entire state but more than one local 
jurisdiction—provide an additional tool for policymakers to strike that 
balance. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/10















II. EXAMPLES OF REGIONAL TAXATION IN  
U.S. SUBNATIONAL PUBLIC FINANCE 
 
Local government in the United States typically features both general-
purpose governments, which include cities and counties, and several 
function-specific special districts, the most common being the K-12 school 
district.25 As explained below, regional tax arrangements have emerged in 
both settings—i.e., (1) through the establishment of  region-wide special 
districts given independent taxing authority, and (2) through coordinated 
taxing arrangements involving multiple general-purpose governments. 
 
A. Taxes Imposed by Regional Transit Districts 
 
Regional tax arrangements are most prevalent in the area of 
transportation finance. Historically, public transportation projects in the 
United States were financed by local property taxes. Because of the 
relationship between transportation projects and land values, the property 
tax served as a type of benefit tax on local landowners. This tight 
connection between burdens and benefits in transportation tax policy 
began to erode in the early 20th century as technological, political, and 
fiscal changes shifted the landscape of U.S. transportation finance. 
Goldman and Wachs identify the introduction of the automobile in the 
1920’s as the key development triggering state and federal involvement in 
transportation finance.26 Over the ensuing half-century a complex web of 
intergovernmental partnerships emerged to handle the construction and 
maintenance of highways, streets, roads, and mass transit systems. During 
this period user fees (including tolls/fares, motor fuel taxes, vehicle license 
fees, truck weight charges) came to dominate transportation finance, 
though by the late 20th century these sources could no longer keep pace 
 
25. Special districts are such a pervasive feature of the modern U.S. local government setting that 
John Oliver devoted an entire segment to the subject on his HBO show, Last Week Tonight.  See 
Melissa Locker, John Oliver Dedicates a Special Episode of Last Week Tonight to Special Districts, 
TIME (Mar. 7, 2016), time.com/4249255/john-oliver-last-week-tonight-special-districts. 
26. Todd Goldman & Martin Wachs, A Quiet Revolution in Transportation Finance: The Rise of 
Local Transportation Taxes, 57 TRANSP. Q., Winter 2003, at 19, 19. 
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with spending demands. To fill that funding gap, many states and localities 
turned to local option sales taxes, most commonly approved via local 
ballot initiative and earmarked for specific transportation projects.27 
Goldman and Wachs describe this development as a “quiet revolution” in 
transportation finance, noting that various types of local option taxes, but 
mostly sales taxes, have now supplanted the previous user fee model.28 
Local option taxes—typically though not always sales taxes—are now a 
major feature of transit agency finance, accounting for 28% of operating 
funds (second only to fares) and 33% of capital funds (second only to 
federal assistance).29   
This increased reliance on local option sales taxes to fund transportation 
projects has been accompanied by related developments in transportation 
federalism. In 1962, as part of the Federal-Aid Highway Act, Congress 
required the states to establish Metropolitan Planning Organizations 
(MPOs) to coordinate and prioritize transportation projects financed with 
federal tax dollars.30 Congress later significantly expanded the power and 
responsibilities of MPOs through the Intermodal Surface Transportation 
Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA).31 These regional entities now play a 
central role in regional transportation planning, though they typically have 
no independent taxing authority but rather channel federal resources to 
local projects. These two developments—the rise of local option sales tax 
funding and the enhanced role of the federally-mandated MPO—have 
given rise to a mismatch between funding and governance. While the taxes 
to finance metro-level transportation projects are derived increasingly 
from fragmented local jurisdictions, federal law explicitly requires a 
planning process that takes account of regional-metropolitan needs. 
The regional sales taxes adopted in several metropolitan regions can be 
viewed as an effort to address that mismatch – i.e., a step in the direction 
 
27. Id. at 19-20. 
28. Id. 
29. OFFICE OF BUDGET & POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., TRANSIT PROFILES: 2013 REPORT YEAR 
SUMMARY (2014).  
30. The history of the establishment of metropolitan planning organizations is usefully recounted in 
a 1988 Department of Transportation report, the most relevant excerpts of which are available on the 
website of the Association of Metropolitan Planning Organizations. See A Brief History, ASS’N 
METROPOLITAN PLANNING ORGS., www.ampo.org/about-us/about-mpos/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2019). 
31. Robert W. Gage & Bruce D. McDowell, ISTEA and the Role of MPOs in the New 
Transportation Environment: A Midterm Assessment 25 PUBLIUS 133 (1995). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/10
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of developing a metropolitan fiscal structure more in keeping with the 
coordinated regional planning process envisioned by federal transportation 
law. Multi-county transportation taxes are now in place in numerous 
metropolitan regions, including Chicago (covering 6 counties), Denver 
(covering 8 counties), Portland (covering 3 counties), San Francisco 
(covering 3 counties), and Seattle (covering 3 counties), to name just a 
few. The regional tax adopted to fund the Seattle transit district—the 
Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority (i.e., Sound Transit)—
raises several interesting issues about regional taxation more generally.  
Sound Transit operates the regional mass transit system spanning King, 
Snohomish, and Pierce counties in Washington, an area that accounts for 
nearly half of the state’s population.32 Its services include light rail, 
commuter rail, and a regional express bus system, as well as the 
construction and maintenance of other transit-related facilities (e.g., HOV 
lanes, transit stations).33 
The district was established by legislation enacted by the Washington 
state legislature in 1992.34 This legislation was based on a finding that a 
single agency spanning all three counties was necessary to address the 
mobility needs of the region’s growing population.35 Among other things, 
Sound Transit’s enabling legislation transferred governmental powers 
previously vested in local governments to the new multicounty district, 
including the power to impose a variety of new taxes for transportation 
purposes.36  
The Seattle experience with Sound Transit provides a useful illustration 
of the value of regionalizing the provision and financing of an important 
public good. It is an example of a community responding to the changing 
“geography of problems” by devising alternative jurisdictional 
arrangements more suited to the task at hand. The formation of a new 
 
32. See infra Figure 1. 
33. SOUND TRANSIT 3: THE REGIONAL TRANSIT SYSTEM PLAN FOR CENTRAL PUGET SOUND (June 
2016) (at https://st32.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/Document%20Library%20Featured/8-22-
16/ST3_System-Plan_2016_web.pdf) 
34. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 81.112 (2018). 
35. SOUND MOVE: LAUNCHING A RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEM FOR THE PUGET SOUND REGION (1996) 
(a photo image of the original 1996 document is available at 
https://www.soundtransit.org/sites/default/file 
s/documents/199605-sound-move-ten-year-regional-transit-system-plan.pdf)   
36. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 81.112.100 (2018). 
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multi-county district with independent taxing powers marks a recognition 
that existing local governments, with their more circumscribed geographic 
scope, were not equipped to meet the demands of providing this new 
public good (i.e., coordinated region-wide public transportation). 
Likewise, the state government, whose geographical boundaries 
encompass territory beyond the affected region, lacks the necessary 
correspondence with the benefitted area. 
Initially Sound Transit relied on three separate regional taxes to fund its 
operations, including a 0.9% sales tax, a 0.8% rental car tax, and a 0.3% 
motor vehicle tax (MVET). As required by state law, all of Sound 
Transit’s taxes have been approved by voters in the three participating 
counties at elections held in 1996 (approval of the “Sound Move” transit 
plan) and 2008 (approval of the “Sound Transit 2” plan). In addition, as 
part of the “Sound Transit 3” plan approved in November 2016, voters 
adopted a new regional property tax.37 In combination, these four taxes 
generated roughly $1.5 billion in revenue for Sound Transit in 2017 with 
the regional sales tax constituting over $1.1 billion of that amount.38 
The purpose of these taxes is, of course, to fund the regional transit 
operations of the organization. Interestingly, however, each of the Sound 
Transit plans for the use of these revenues has incorporated a requirement 
of “subarea equity” according to which tax revenues must be used “for 
projects and services which benefit the subareas generally in proportion to 
the level of revenues each subarea generates.”39 A Harvard case study 
detailing the political history of Sound Transit explains that this 
requirement was a “controversial, but arguably essential, compromise” to 
ensure approval of the original transit plan in November 1996. 40  All 
subsequent iterations of the Sound Transit plan approved by voters, 
 
37. PAYING FOR REGIONAL TRANSIT: VOTER-APPROVED TAXES THAT PAY FOR NEW TRANSIT, 
available at https://www.soundtransit.org/get-to-know-us/paying-regional-transit).  
38. DRAFT TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2018-2023 AND 2017 ANNUAL REPORT (2018) (see Table 
VIII at page 26).  
39. This language was included as a component of the original 1996 proposal, titled “Sound Move” 
(supra note 34). For a discussion of this background, see page 4-5 of Central Puget Sound Regional 
Transit Authority, 2016 Financial Plan (June 2016) (at 
https://www.soundtransit.org/sites/defaultt/files/ 
2016-Financial-Plan.pdf)  
40. SUSAN ROSEGRANT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, 
SOUND MOVE (A): THE DEBATE OVER SEATTLE’S REGIONAL TRANSIT SYSTEM 10 (2001). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/10
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including ST3 in November 2016, have included the same subarea equity 
provision. Under the terms of this proviso, the entire transit region is 
divided into five subareas consisting of Snohomish County, Seattle/North 
King County, East King County, South King County, and Pierce County. 
The district is required to fund projects for each subarea reflecting its 
contribution to tax revenues, unless the district’s board of directors 
suspended the requirement by a two-thirds vote.41 An annual “Subarea 
Equity Report” provides a detailed accounting specifying the geographic 
sources and uses of Sound Transit funds by subarea.42   
Sound Transit’s subarea equity rule reflects the powerful political pull 
of what some have called a “return to source” principle, whereby revenues 
generated in a particular geographic area are channeled to projects 
specifically benefitting that area.43 The role such a principle should play in 
regional taxing arrangements is not self-evident. On the one hand, a return 
to source approach might be justified on the basis that it establishes a 
stronger burden-benefit linkage, ensuring that each subarea’s tax burden 
more closely approximates price-like “benefit taxes.” Reliance on benefit 
taxes is one of the hallmark features of an efficient system of local public 
finance.44 To the extent that local tax burdens deviate from the benefit 
principle, mobile economic units are more likely to respond by relocating 
to a jurisdiction that offer more advantageous pricing of local public 
goods.45 
On the other hand, returning locally-generated taxes to the communities 
that generate them arguably defeats the purpose of undertaking projects at 
a regional level. If the purpose of establishing regional taxes is to fund 
regional public goods, then directing tax proceeds according to a “return 
 
41. Id. 
42. KPMG, CENTRAL PUGET SOUND REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY: SCHEDULE OF SOURCES AND 
USES OF FUNDS BY SUBAREA, YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2014 (2015); KPMG, CENTRAL PUGET 
SOUND REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY: SCHEDULE OF SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS BY SUBAREA, 
YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2015 (2016). 
43. For a useful discussion of return-to-source equity concepts in the transportation finance setting, 
see Alan Altshuler, Equity, Pricing, and Surface Transportation Politics, 46 URB. AFF. REV.155 
(2010). 
44. Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
45. Keith Dowding et al., Tiebout: A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 31 URB. STUD. 767 (1994). 
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to source” principle seems counter to that rationale.46 In addition, in the 
particular case of Sound Transit, the bottom line effect of the subarea 
equity was, at least according to some, very regressive. For example, Greg 
Nickels, one of the key participants involved in the formulation of the 
plan, noted that the chief beneficiary of subarea equity was East King 
County, which includes some of the most affluent communities in the 
region. Nickels noted that “East King County has a very healthy tax base, 
people are buying BMWs all the time, so they have lots of motor vehicle 
tax money. But you can’t use that financial strength for any other place but 
East King County.”47 Whatever the merits of the subarea equity principle 
in theory, as a practical matter it appears that it was essential to the 
program’s passage. The inclusion of this requirement as part of the voter-
approved transit plan suggests that voters were sufficiently wary of 
ongoing distributive conflicts within the region that a constitutional 
principle was perceived to be necessary to secure the plan’s approval. 
Ensuring compliance with Sound Transit’s principle of subarea equity 
has not been without controversy, as evidenced by news headlines such as 
“The Inequity of Sound Transit Subarea Equity”48 and “Subarea Equity: A 
Stupid Policy is a Stupid Policy is a Stupid Policy.”49 Of course, few 
issues in local politics ever escape this kind of sophomoric sniping. The 
point is to illustrate the practical and political difficulty in carrying out any 
new regional taxing arrangement. The subarea equity requirement might 
suggest political acceptance of Olson’s principle of fiscal equivalence50—
 
46. Sound Transit’s subarea equity principle, where a portion of the tax revenue is required to be 
returned to the geographic areas that contributed it, stands in contrast to the “local return” program of 
the Los Angeles Metro system. Under the LA Metro’s local return program, 25% of revenue must be 
returned to local governments for local projects, but that revenue is distributed among local 
governments according to population rather than based on a determination regarding the source of the 
revenue.  See LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, LOCAL RETURN 
PROGRAM: ENHANCING TRANSPORTATION IN OUR CITIES, COMMUNITIES & LOCAL NEIGHBORHOODS 
(June 2016), http://media.metro.net/projects_studies/local_return/images/report_localreturn_2016-
06.pdf 
47. ROSEGRANT, supra note 39, at 10. 
48. James W. MacIsaac, The Inequity of Sound Transit Subarea Equity, EASTSIDE TRANSP. ASS’N 
(June 11, 2011), http://www.eastsideta.com/docs/The%20Inequity%20of%20Sound%20Transit%20Su 
barea%20Equity.pdf  
49. Goldy, Subarea Equity: A Stupid Policy Is a Stupid Policy Is a Stupid Policy, THE STRANGER 
(April 25, 2013), https://www.thestranger.com/slog/archives/2013/04/25/a-stupid-policy-is-a-stupid-po 
licy-is-a-stupid-policy. 
50. See Olson, supra note 15. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/10
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transit projects should be undertaken to ensure that each subarea gets as 
much back as it puts in—but deviations from that principle (as well as 
perceived deviations) reveal the continuing influence of sub-regional 
political dynamics in devising new regional fiscal institutions. 
In summary, the Seattle region’s experience with Sound Transit reveals 
both the promise and complications of regional taxing arrangements. Most 
observers seem to agree that the region-wide public benefits of a 
metropolitan transit system are substantial. A recent poll of the region’s 
voters undertaken by EMC Research shows that support for giving Sound 
Transit additional taxing authority for expanded projects is at an all-time 
high.51 The District’s new plan, ST3, which appeared on the ballot in 
November 2016, was approved by 54 percent of voters in the three 
counties. While the measure was approved on the required district-wide 
basis, including approval by 58 percent in King County and 52 percent in 
Snohomish County, it bears noting that 56 percent of voters in Pierce 
County rejected ST3.52 This observation draws attention to the fact that, by 
reconfiguring boundaries, regional measures also reconstitute the 
possibilities for political support, perhaps creating opportunities for a type 
of “fiscal gerrymandering” to ensure passage. The possibility of redrawing 
fiscal borders carries with it the opportunity to include or exclude those 
who favor or oppose fiscal measures proposed to be undertaken. 
The Sound Transit experience—especially with respect to ongoing 
conflicts regarding the subarea equity requirement—reveals that regional 
taxing arrangements are unlikely to eliminate inter-local fiscal conflict, but 
rather simply channel that conflict through new political institutions. 
 
B. Taxes Imposed by Regional Cultural Asset Districts 
 
While regional taxes are most commonly observed in the context of 
 
51. Adam Lynn, New Long Term Taxes Would Pay for Sound Transit Expansion, TACOMA NEWS 
TRIBUNE (Apr. 16, 2016), www.wsdot.wa.gov/partners/erp/background/newsclips_re_ST3_April-
May2 
016.pdf 
52. Washington Proposition 1 – Sound Transit 3 Builds 62 Miles of Light Rail – Results Approved, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/washington-ballot-
measure 
-1-sound-transit-3.  
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metropolitan transit funding, it is not the only area where these taxes have 
emerged. More recently, a small number of metropolitan regions have 
begun to rely on region-wide taxes to fund so-called “cultural assets” such 
as museums, theaters, and zoos. So-called “cultural tax districts” have 
been established in metropolitan areas of Denver, Portland, St. Louis, Salt 
Lake City, and a handful of other, smaller jurisdictions.53 The emergence 
of these new regional districts is interesting in part because they shed light 
on a concept from the theoretical public finance literature known as the 
“zoo effect.” Oates describes the zoo effect through the following simple 
example:  
Suppose that the annual cost of a municipal zoo is $1 million. Suppose 
further that the willingness to pay of each individual for ‘zoo services’ is 
$1 per annum. If local fiscal choices are made efficiently, we would expect 
to find jurisdictions with populations in excess of 1 million providing 
zoos, while jurisdictions with populations under 1 million would not deem 
it worthwhile to have a zoo. 54 
The Denver experience provides a useful illustration of this 
phenomenon. In 1987, the Colorado legislature enacted legislation 
authorizing the establishment of a Scientific and Cultural Facilities District 
(SCFD) that would cover seven counties through the Denver metropolitan 
area.55 
The idea of establishing a region-wide cultural asset district emerged in 
the wake of budget cuts in 1981 that jeopardized the continued operation 
of several city-operated cultural institutions—the Denver Art Museum, the 
Denver Zoo, the Museum of Natural History, the Denver Center for the 
Performing Arts, and the Denver Botanic Gardens. Prior to the formation 
of the SCFD, each of these institutions was financed through user fees and 
tax revenue from the City of Denver.56 By contrast, the SCFD enabling 
legislation  authorizes the imposition of a region-wide sales tax, applicable 
 
53. For a review of the experience with cultural tax districts in select cities, see VANDERBILT 
CENTER FOR NASHVILLE STUDIES, CULTURAL TAX DISTRICT: A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF CURRENT 
IMPLICATIONS (2010), available at https://www.vanderbilt.edu/vcns/Cultural_Tax_Report.pdf.   
54. Wallace Oates, On the Measurement of Congestion in the Provision of Local Public Goods, 24 
J. URB. ECON. 85, 88 (1988). 
55. See infra Figure 2. 
56. See Why Was SCFD Created?, SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL ACTIVITIES DISTRICT, scfd.org/blog-
entry/49/2014-05-22-why-was-scfd-created.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2019). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/10
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across all seven counties, and subject to approval by voters in the entire 
district.57 
One possible explanation for the emergence of the SCFD as a regional 
solution derives from the “zoo effect” noted above. In the standard 
narrative of SCFD’s formation, the budget cuts of the early 1980s are 
portrayed as an exogenous factor that threatened the viability of the city’s 
key cultural institutions. But another interpretation is that city residents no 
longer valued these local “cultural services” at a high enough level to 
support their continued existence. Put differently, for whatever reason 
(economic recession, changing voter preferences for public goods, etc.), 
the average Denver voter’s willingness to pay for these public goods 
dipped below the critical threshold required for public provision to make 
sense. Rather than terminating the programs, policy entrepreneurs 
formulated an alternative approach enlarging the boundaries of the taxing 
jurisdiction so as to reduce per capita cost of the providing the public 
good.  
In 1994 and 2004, SCFD voters approved a sales tax of 0.1% to support 
SCFD funding. The tax currently generates just over $50 million per year 
in revenue that is allocated through a three-tiered system that differentiates 
among small, medium, and large recipients. From the outset, the SCFD 
funding formula has largely favored the large “Tier I” entities constituting 
the key Denver-based cultural facilities. These organizations receive 
roughly two-thirds of all SCFD funding. This approach is not surprising, 
as it was the preservation of these facilities that motivated the creation of 
the SCFD in the first place. Nevertheless, this allocation arrangement has 
come under criticism in recent years, in part due to demands from 
constituencies outside of Denver who feel that the allocation formula 
favors the City of Denver over other parts of the region. In effect, these 
groups are pushing for a “return to source” principle for revenue sharing 
similar to the “subarea equity” requirement in operation in Seattle’s Sound 
Transit district. While the SCFD is not subject to a formal requirement like 
the Sound Transit, the 2016 reauthorization of the District and its sales tax 
prompted public debate about the allocation formula.58 Under the terms of 
 
57. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-13 (1987). 
58. Maggie Hodge Kwan, Denver’s Contentious Arts and Culture Funding Splinters Community, 
NONPROFIT Q. (Aug. 24, 2015), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2015/08/24/denvers-contentious-arts-
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the 2016 reapproval, Tier II and Tier III organizations (chiefly outside 
Denver) received significantly greater resources.  
 
*   *   * 
 
The examples of regional taxation discussed above illustrate how 
different communities, facing complex questions about whether and how 
to provide certain public goods, have grappled with the question of scale 
and the geographic scope of tax policy. Should these goods be provided at 
the local level? Or is a regional approach more appropriate? These are 
difficult question even from a theoretical perspective, involving, as they 
must, factors such as preference heterogeneity, economies of scale, and 
interjurisdictional spillovers. The Seattle and Denver examples illustrate 
that the reality on the ground is substantially “messier” than the elegant 
world of theory since it involves myriad other variables. Nevertheless, the 
examples reveal the powerful pull of concepts such as Oates’ 
correspondence principle and Olson’s principle of fiscal equivalence. By 
broadening the scope of fiscal benefits and burden to the regional level, 
these communities are aiming for a tighter fit between burden and benefit. 
For the specific public goods in question, local governments are either 
unable or unlikely to provide the financing, while state-wide 
constituencies are often too broad and diverse to ensure political support. 
Regional arrangements constitute an intermediate approach where the 
geographic parameters offer a better fit with the spatial characteristics of 
the services in question. 
While the motivation for the regional districts discussed above was to 
fund particular public goods, the arrangements also shed light on the 
question of “tax harmonization.” By definition, a financing scheme 
consisting of a single region-wide tax exhibits greater uniformity than one 
that relies on separate local taxes to provide local public goods. 
Individuals or firms who might have changed their behavior in response to 
inter-local variation in tax burdens, whether through locational decisions 
 
and-culture-funding-splinters-community/?utm_source=email&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign= 
SocialWarfare; Mark Ray Rinaldi, Colorado Arts Groups Take Sides in a Battle Over Millions in 
Funding, THE DENVER POST (Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.denverpost.com/2015/08/30/colorado-arts-
groups-take-sides-in-a-battle-over-millions-in-funding/. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/10
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or otherwise, face a diminished opportunity set in world of regional taxes. 
Their choice now is among regions rather than among localities. This 
feature is not unique to regional tax arrangements funding regional public 
goods but is also present (though perhaps to a lesser degree) in the case of 
regional tax base sharing. 
 
C.  Regional Tax Base Sharing 
 
A close cousin to regional taxation is regional tax base sharing. The 
chief distinction between the two types of arrangements concerns the use 
of the funds generated by a region-wide tax. In the case of the taxes 
discussed above, the decision to establish regional taxing districts arose 
chiefly from the desire to fund specific public goods or services with 
spatial characteristics that were more regional than local. In the case of 
regional tax-base sharing, however, there is no particular funding objective 
other than the activities of general-purpose local governments within the 
region. While this policy is far less common than the regional taxes 
discussed above, the best known example—the longstanding tax base 
sharing policy in effect in the St. Paul-Minneapolis region—has spawned a 
large academic literature across several disciplines assessing its pros and 
cons. 
The Twin Cities fiscal disparities regime has been in place for over 40 
years.59 The Minnesota legislature adopted the program via the 
Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities Act in 1971 following several years of 
controversy over urban growth issues in the Twin Cities.60  After litigation 
over the constitutionality of the statute was resolved by a Minnesota 
Supreme Court decision in 1974,61 the new policy took effect in 1975. The 
Act governs the seven-county metropolitan area of Minneapolis-St. Paul62 
and provides a mechanism by which 40% of the increased revenue 
resulting from a uniform property tax on commercial and industrial 
 
59. Myron Orfield & Nicholas Wallace, The Minnesota Fiscal Disparities Act of 1971: The Twin 
Cities’ Struggle and Blueprint for Regional Cooperation, 33 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 591 (2007) 
(discussing history of Minnesota Fiscal Disparities legislation). 
60. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473F.001 (West 1992). 
61. Vill. of Burnsville v. Onischuk, 22 N.W.2d 523 (Minn. 1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 916 
(1975). 
62. See infra Figure 3. 
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property is pooled and redistributed to communities according to their 
relative fiscal capacity. 
The Minnesota statute lists six purposes: 
(1) to provide a way for local governments to share in the resources 
generated by the growth of the area, without removing any resources 
which local governments already have; 
(2) to increase the likelihood of orderly urban development by reducing 
the impact of fiscal considerations on the location of business and 
residential growth and of highways, transit facilities and airports; 
(3) to establish incentives for all parts of the area to work for the growth 
of the area as a whole; 
(4) to provide a way whereby the area's resources can be made available 
within and through the existing system of local governments and local 
decision making; 
(5) to help communities in different stages of development by making 
resources increasingly available to communities at those early stages of 
development and redevelopment when financial pressures on them are the 
greatest; and 
(6) to encourage protection of the environment by reducing the impact 
of fiscal considerations so that flood plains can be protected and land for 
parks and open space can be preserved. 63 
Leaving aside for the moment whether or not the Twin Cities tax 
sharing arrangement adopted actually accomplishes these objectives, such 
a system has certain features that one might regard as desirable from the 
perspective of normative fiscal federalism.  
First, the sharing arrangement regionalizes that portion of the 
commercial and industrial tax base that is contributed to the region-wide 
pool. In the Twin Cities, this means that the commercial-industrial 
property tax is effectively bifurcated into two separate taxes: a local 
portion to which differentiated local rates continue apply and a regional 
portion to which a uniform “area-wide rate” applies. The local portion of 
the tax base consists of that portion of the commercial-industrial tax base 
that is not subject to region-wide pooling (i.e., 100% of the pre-1971 
commercial-industrial tax base plus 60% of the growth in the commercial-
 
63. MINN. STAT. ANN. Ch. § 473F.001 et seq. (2017).  
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industrial tax base). In effect, the tax base sharing system provides for 
“partial tax harmonization” across the region—i.e., to the extent of 40% of 
the post-1971 growth in the tax base. Because it is partial, such a regime 
does not eliminate the influence of local property tax rate differentials on 
firms’ locational decisions—or the corresponding competition for tax base 
among local communities—however, it should reduce the effect of those 
forces. By requiring that the revenue benefits of commercial-industrial 
property must be shared, the system discourages beggar-thy-neighbor 
policies associated with interjurisdictional tax competition.  
Second, the manner in which the pooled revenues are distributed among 
local communities (i.e., cities and townships) should further reduce tax 
induced migration. Under the tax sharing arrangement, the proceeds from 
the uniform tax on commercial-industrial property are required to be 
returned to communities in inverse relation to each community’s per 
capita fiscal capacity.64 This means that municipalities with below average 
fiscal capacity (as measured by the non-pooled portion of the property tax) 
receive a larger share of the pooled funds than if determined by their 
population share alone. For 2016, the top five net recipients were St. Paul, 
Brooklyn Park, Coon Rapids, Brooklyn Center, and Columbia Heights.65 
Likewise, communities with above average fiscal capacity will receive a 
smaller share. For 2016, the top five net contributors were Bloomington 
(home to the Mall of America), Eden Prairie, Minnetonka, Plymouth, and 
Edina.66  
The region’s tax sharing arrangement reduces, but does not eliminate, 
property tax disparities among the region’s municipalities and townships. 
By doing so, the regime should also reduce the influence of those 
disparities on household and firm locational decisions, at least insofar as 
those disparities might have otherwise influenced private actors’ locational 
decisions. In effect, equalization grants improve the terms of fiscal 
 
64. For a useful and accessible overview of the program, see Fiscal Disparities: Tax-Base Sharing 
in the Metro Area, METRO. COUNCIL,  https://metrocouncil.org/Communities/Planning/Local-
Planning-As 
sistance/Fiscal-Disparities-(2).aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 2019).  
65. See Fiscal Disparities in Twin Cities: Key Findings for Taxes Payable in 2016,  METRO. 
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exchange in low-capacity jurisdictions, neutralizing the influence of 
interjurisdictional fiscal capacity differentials on locational decisions. 
Early theoretical work on fiscal equalization identified this effect as a key 
efficiency justification for employing equalization grants in a federal 
regime.67   
Shortly after the Minnesota statute was enacted, several researchers 
undertook studies to evaluate its merits and likely effects. Perhaps the 
most critical analysis was offered by Fischel who relied on a theory of tax 
payments as compensation for firms’ undesirable neighborhood effects to 
conclude that the program would likely have inefficient land use effects.68 
Fischel also expressed skepticism that Twin Cities program would have 
the desired distributional effects based on a simulation of a similar 
hypothetical program using family income data from Newark, New 
Jersey.69 Fisher was also critical of the program but for different reasons.70 
Analogizing the Minnesota statute to a system of equalization grants, 
Fisher highlighted certain perverse results. First, by pooling only the post-
1971 growth in the commercial-industrial tax base, the program was 
necessarily limited in its ability to achieve any meaningful reduction in 
fiscal disparities. Thus, by definition, any fiscal disparities in place as of 
1971 would be unaffected by the new program.  Second, this same feature, 
in combination with the distribution formula (which envisions only 
positive distributions from the pool), essentially “cripples the ability of the 
Minnesota plan to redistribute tax base away from wealthy communities 
which have not experienced growth in commercial industrial tax base.”71 
A more positive analysis was offered by Reschovsky who found the 
Minnesota plan to be “moderately successful” with regard to its equity 
objectives of reducing fiscal disparities among participating 
communities.72 However, as to the plan’s effect on encouraging efficient 
 
67. James M. Buchanan, Federalism and Fiscal Equity, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 583, 591-93 (1950). 
68. William A. Fischel, Fiscal and Environmental Considerations in the Location of Firms in 
Suburban Communities, in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS 119 (Edwin S. Mills & Wallace 
E. Oates eds., 1975). 
69. Id. 
70. Peter S. Fisher, Regional Tax-Base Sharing: An Analysis and Simulation of Alternative 
Approaches, 58 LAND ECON. 497 (1982). 
71. Id. 
72. Andrew Reschovsky, An Evaluation of Metropolitan Area Tax Base Sharing, 33 NAT’L TAX J. 
55, 62-63 (1980). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/10










2019]  Regional Taxation 141 
 
 
patterns of economic development, Reschovsky concluded that the most 
that could be said is that “base sharing may have a marginal influence on 
development patterns.”73  Reschovsky offers an additional justification for 
the regime relating to its symbolic value, noting that “base sharing may 
create an awareness among metropolitan area citizens and local 
governments of the economic and environmental interrelationships that 
exist within the area.”74 
Note that, with respect to the area-wide rate, the commercial-industrial 
property tax for the Minneapolis-St. Paul region is the equivalent to a 
regional tax, similar to the regional taxes in Seattle and Denver, discussed 
above.75 Unlike those taxes, however, there is no specific regional public 
good financed by the Minneapolis-St. Paul regional property tax. Rather, 
the revenues are distributed to (and from) the various general-purpose 
governments within the seven-county area. Thus, the rationale for “going 
regional” is not (and could not be) the spatial characteristics of some 
specific public good/service. Rather, the justification for imposing a 
regional tax inheres in the nature of the tax itself. By imposing a 
commercial-industrial property tax on a region-wide basis, rather than on a 
local basis, taxpayer exit opportunities and the resulting interjurisdictional 
tax competition are diminished. Thus, the attraction of regional tax base 
sharing consists of its tax assignment properties — i.e., the superiority of 
imposing at least certain taxes at a level of government representing 
broader geographic scope.  
This approach could prove useful for certain taxes relied upon by local 
governments that could be more effectively designed as regional taxes. For 
example, local government reliance on retail sales taxes introduces 
predictable distortions in cross-border shopping (who may choose where 
to shop based on sales tax rate differentials) and locational decisions of 
retailers (who may demand concessions from local governments in 
exchange for locating a store likely to generate significant sales tax 
revenues). These problems could be avoided, or at least mitigated, by 
shifting local retail sales taxes to a regional level and apportioning the 
revenue among general-purpose local governments within the region. It 
 
73. Id. at 64. 
74. Id. at 65. 
75. See supra Parts III.A & III.B. 
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bears noting that, even if the revenues were not distributed among local 
governments according to relative fiscal capacity (as in the Twin Cities 
program), this reform would alleviate the adverse effects of local reliance 
on retail sales taxes. Put differently, tax base sharing has independent 
value as a tax assignment tool, even if it is not used as a mechanism for 
alleviating fiscal disparities among the local governments within the 
region. 
 
III. IMAGINING A BROADER ROLE FOR  
REGIONAL TAXES: CALIFORNIA 
 
Each of the examples considered in the previous section has its own 
peculiar, organic history. Each is responsive to a unique constellation of 
economic, political, and institutional circumstances. Nevertheless, it is 
worth asking whether and how other states might make use of the some of 
the regional fiscal innovations discussed above. 
In California, for example, some commentators have raised the 
possibility of including “regional financing powers” on the agenda for 
state tax reform as a means of increasing local revenue authority.76 In a 
2015 report on reforming California’s tax system, California Forward 
notes that, at present, California regions “do not have a method for 
financing investments (in infrastructure, say) on a regional scale.” The 
organization therefore raises for consideration the idea of creating “a 
regional financing authority for regional infrastructure projects—from 
transit systems and housing to next-generation water facilities.”77   
There are some preliminary indications of interest in regional taxing 
arrangements in the Golden State. One noteworthy example is the 
approval in June 2016 of a new region-wide parcel tax adopted by the San 
Francisco Bay Restoration Authority to fund shoreline projects promoting 
bay restoration efforts in the Authority’s 9-county region.78 A key selling 
 
76. CA FWD, Financing the Future: How will California pay  for tomorrow? Ch. 3: From revenue 
to results:  Considering today’s tax proposals (2015), 
https://app.box.com/embed/preview/5zjogpla3ahj95 
cmfdaxhc5ein0eapmm?theme=dark. 
77. Id. at 18. 
78. Melody Gutierrez, SF Bay Protection: Measure AA Passes, SFGATE (June 8, 2016), 
http://www.s 
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point for the Measure AA enacting the regional tax was the need to fund 
projects designed to mitigate the effects of climate change, including the 
implications of rising sea levels on bay ecology.79 The San Francisco Bay 
borders on nine counties, but due to spillover effects no one county would 
have the incentive to act alone to address the restoration projects to be 
undertaken by the regional authority. Put differently, just like metropolitan 
wide transit systems or regional cultural districts, the spatial characteristics 
of bay restoration do not correspond with the boundaries of existing 
general-purpose governments. To use the language of Eichenberger and 
Frey, climate change has introduced a new “geography of problems” for 
the San Francisco Bay, requiring a reconfiguration of conventional 
jurisdictional boundaries to respond effectively.80 
As with the Sound Transit example discussed above, the political 
dynamics of a regional approach to bay restoration were also an important 
dimension of the success of the parcel tax. Under California law, a 
“special” tax earmarked for a particular purpose requires approval of two-
thirds of voters in the taxing district.81 Measure AA was approved by 
70.32 percent of voters, but only exceeded the two-thirds threshold in five 
of the nine counties. Strong supermajorities in the three largest counties 
(Santa Clara, Alameda, and San Francisco) helped to make up for the 
failure of the measure to secure supermajority support in other counties.82 
This outcome suggests a possible alternative rationale for turning to 
regional (or other multijurisdictional) arrangements – i.e., the ability to 
draw boundaries in such a manner as to ensure political support for the 
fiscal measures undertaken. 
Beyond the new parcel tax of the San Francisco Bay Restoration 
Authority, and the existing transit taxes in both the Bay Area and Los 
Angeles County (Measure R, Measure M), there are very few examples of 
regional taxes in California. However, there are a variety of contexts in 
which such regional taxes might make sense. In a recent report on regional 
 
fgate.com/politics/article/SF-Bay-protection-Measure-AA-passes-7970365.phb 
79. Jed Kim, San Francisco Area Voters Pave the Way for Climate Adaptation, MARKETPLACE 
(Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.marketplace.org/2016/11/02/sustainability/san-francisco-area-voters-
paved-way-climate-adaptation. 
80. Eichenberger & Frey, supra note 17. 
81. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53722 (West 2017). 
82. Guttierez, supra note 78. 
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economic development, for example, the Bay Area Council Economic 
Institute highlighted the absence of any funding source for regional 
projects.83 Many of the problems identified in the report—e.g., 
infrastructure development, affordable housing—are fundamentally 
regional problems, but there is no regional entity with taxing authority to 
address these issues. Significantly, there appears to be some political 
momentum, albeit preliminary, to develop regional tax policies to address 
these issues. Most recently, a group of Bay Area stakeholders convened by 
the region’s Metropolitan Transportation Commission and ABAG 
(Association of Bay Area Governments) proposed a “regional housing 
tax” designed to raise $1.5 billion to address affordable housing in the 
region.84 
With regard to regional tax base sharing, perhaps the most obvious 
candidate for reform in California is the existing patchwork of local sales 
taxes, a common characteristic in most sales tax states that permit local 
option sales taxes as add-on to the state sales tax rate. Beginning in the 
1950s, California allowed municipalities to impose a 1% sales tax, 
authorized through the Bradley-Burns Uniform Sales/Use Tax statute.85 In 
addition, many localities impose additional local sales tax for specific 
purposes (e.g., transportation projects) beyond the Bradley-Burns levy.86 
Because these taxes apply on a point-of-sale basis, municipalities have a 
very strong incentive to attract big-box retailers, car dealerships, and other 
firms that are likely to generate significant sales tax receipts. The resulting 
interlocal competition for these retailers is a symptom of the fundamental 
mis-assignment of the sales tax to local governments. It is not uncommon 
for localities to promise to rebate a significant share of the sales tax 
revenues to the retailer in order to attract them to locate their facilities in 
the city.87 The result is that consumers face a different sales tax rate 
 
83. BAY AREA COUNCIL ECON. INST., A ROADMAP FOR ECONOMIC RESILIENCE: THE BAY AREA 
ECONOMIC STRATEGY 25 (2015), http://www.bayareaeconomy.org/files/pdf/BACEI-RES-Report.pdf. 
84. Elaine Goodman, Regional Housing Tax in the Works – 9-county Agency Looks to Raise $1.5 
Billion a Year, PALO ALTO DAILY POST (October 5, 2018), 
https://padailypost.com/2018/10/06/regional 
-housing-tax-in-the-works-9-county-agency-looks-to-raise-1-5-billion-a-year/. 
85. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 72002 (West 2017). 
86. See Local Countryside Trasportation Sales Taxes, CALIFORNIACITYFINANCE.COM, Sept. 27, 
2010, www.californiacityfinance.com/trasnsptrusetax.pdf 
87. RICHARD B. FULTON, THE RELUCTANT METROPOLIS: THE POLITICS OF URBAN GROWTH IN LOS 
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depending on where they purchase an item, and revenue from the local 
portion of the sales tax is diminished by the rebates provided by the 
municipality. 
A solution to this longstanding problem would be to re-assign the local 
portion of the sales tax to a higher level of government and allocate the 
revenue to all municipalities. While one option for doing this would be to 
have all sales taxes collected by the state, a less disruptive alternative 
would be to convert local sales taxes within any given region to a uniform 
region-wide sales tax, the proceeds of which be allocated among local 
governments within the region.  
Yet another possibility is would be the use of the state’s new Enhanced 
Infrastructure Financing Districts (EIFDs) as a possible vehicle through 
which regional financing authorities could be established. The EIFD 
legislation, which took effect in early 2015, permits a city or county (as 
well as multiple cities or counties) to establish a district, arrange for 
property tax increment financing, and issue bonds (subject to voter 
approval) for a wide range of infrastructure needs, including 
transportation, sewage and water facilities, parks, libraries, and various 
other projects.88 Because the EIFD legislation is so new, no city or county 
has yet established a district under the new law. At present, the only 
project under consideration is the use of an EIFD to fund a revitalization 
of the Los Angeles River.89 
In imagining a role for regional fiscal arrangements in California, one 
possibility would be vesting EIFDs or EIFD-type entities with the power 
to tax. The California Forward report referenced above raises the 
possibility of assigning to a new regional authority the power to impose 
vehicle license fees, water usage and waste management charges, or even 
a local income tax.90 The choice of revenue instrument would no doubt 
depend on the nature of the district, its specific responsibilities, and its 
 
ANGELES 255-282 (2001). 
88. LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES, PRIMER ON CALIFORNIA’S NEW TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 
TOOLS (2017), https://www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/Policy-Advocacy-Section/Hot-Issues/N 
ew-Tax-Increment-Tools/CALED-TIF-Primer-3-17-FINAL.aspx. 
89. Rachel Kaufman, New California Financing Twist Could Help L.A. River Makeover, NEXT 
CITY (Feb. 5, 2015), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/new-california-funding-tool-eifd-financing-la-
river-make 
over. 
90. CA Fwd, supra note 76, at 18. 
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geographic scope.  
The possibility of a regional income tax, earmarked for some specific 
regional program, is particularly intriguing. The consensus view in the tax 
assignment literature is that income taxes should generally be reserved for 
the federal or state governments.91 This view accords with the more 
general admonition in the literature against local reliance on ability-to-pay 
taxes, which might induce migration both on the part of high-earners 
seeking to avoid redistribution and low-earners seeking to benefit from it. 
On the other hand, there are several advantages of relying on income taxes 
(most notably the ability to piggy-back on existing federal and state 
income taxes), and the disadvantages from relying on them in the local 
setting may be less acute in a regional setting. For example, a modest 
income tax covering the six-county region of the Southern California 
Association of Governments (SCAG)—which spans 38,000 square miles 
(an area larger than thirteen states) is significantly less likely to raise 
migration concerns than a tax imposed by the City of Santa Monica. 
Another regional tax option deserving consideration involves the 
commercial and industrial component of the California property tax. For 
several years, there has been discussion of the state possibly adopting a 
“split roll” property tax whereby commercial and industrial property 
would be periodically reassessed at its fair market value.92 Under current 
law (Proposition 13), real property is generally assessed at its purchase 
price, with a maximum growth in the assessed value of 2 percent per year 
or reassessed to market value upon a change of ownership.93 Revenue 
estimates indicate that adoption of a split roll on a statewide basis could 
generate as much as $5-$10 billion per year.94 But these estimates vary 
significantly by region, as does the political appetite for amending 
Proposition 13. An optional region-wide split roll (perhaps even coupled 
 
91. See, e.g., Bev Dahlby, Taxing Choices: Issues in the Assignment of Taxes in Federations, INT’L 
SOC. SCI. J., Dec. 16, 2002, at 91, 96. 
92. See Kirk J. Stark, Reforming Proposition 13 to Tax Land More and Buildings Less, available in 
CALIFORNIA POLICY OPTIONS 2016 (ed. Daniel J.B. Mitchell 2016); Matt Levin, Prop 13 Could Be 
Partly Undone in 2020—Here’s What You Should Know, CALMATTERS (Aug. 14, 2018). 
93. CAL.CONST. art. XIIIA. 
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with some flexibility in the setting of the rate) could provide an additional 
source of revenue for regional initiatives. One might even imagine a tax 
base sharing arrangement among counties, along the lines of the St. Paul-
Minneapolis fiscal disparities program. 
The adoption of new regional taxes, whether in California or elsewhere, 
is not without potential downsides. Taxpayers already face local taxes, 
state taxes, and federal taxes. Introducing regional taxes into the mix 
would bring greater institutional complexity, increasing the costs of 
administration and compliance. Additionally, layering in regional tax 
arrangements on top of existing taxes could make it more difficult to 
understand the source and function of different tax payments, triggering a 
type of information overload for taxpayers facing a web of overlapping tax 
obligations. These are legitimate concerns relevant to any new policy or 
institutional arrangement. While there are no doubt several benefits to be 
derived from considering regional tax policies, policymakers must 
exercise caution in evaluating alternative policies, weighing not just the 




To date, regional tax arrangements have emerged chiefly in the context 
of what might be termed “boutique” public finance, i.e., very 
particularized circumstances relating to relatively narrow topics such as 
metropolitan transit finance and cultural districts. And while regional tax 
base sharing has drawn considerable academic interest, efforts to extend 
such programs beyond the Twin Cities have never gained much traction. 
Thus, there is reason to regard calls for greater “regionalism” in state/local 
tax reform with some skepticism – or at least a dose of realism given the 
dominant influence of political inertia and path dependence on the design 
of fiscal institutions. 
Nevertheless, the potential benefits of these policies are substantial 
enough to warrant inclusion on anyone’s agenda of possible future SALT 
reforms. Regional fiscal institutions, whether by granting independent 
taxing authority to regional authorities or tax sharing arrangements among 
existing local governments, hold promise as a device for mitigating some 
of the adverse fiscal effects of fragmented local government.  
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Figure 1: Region Governed by Central Puget Sound Transit District 
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Figure 3: Region Governed by Minnesota Fiscal Disparities Act 
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